Mutual trust as a backbone of EU Antitrust Law by Kozak, Małgorzata
127
Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 1 / april 2020
Mutual Trust as a Backbone of EU Antitrust Law*
Małgorzata Kozak**
“Trust everyone and trust nobody – is wrong”
Seneca
ABSTRACT: The article is an attempt to analyse to what extent a close cooperation 
between competition authorities belonging to the European Competition Network 
is based on the mutual trust principle. The fundamental importance of the principle 
of mutual trust was underscored in Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of the EU to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), where the Court of Justice found 
that: “it should be noted that the principle of mutual trust between the Member States 
is of fundamental importance in EU law”. 
However, as it was emphasised by the CJEU, mutual trust does not amount to a blind 
trust, as it is illustrated in the case law of the CJEU in cases concerning the European 
Arrest Warrant. The CJEU imposes more and more obligations on executing Member 
States in verifying whether there are no irregularities issuing the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW) in comparison to the early days of its functioning, leading towards 
a regulated or conditioned trust. This development mutatis mutandis is particularly 
interesting to analyse while referring to the functioning of cooperation of competi-
tion authorities within the EU. The research statement of this article is that based 
on the outcome of CJEU case law in cases concerning EAW such as e.g. Aranyosi 
and Căldăraru the trust in institutional cooperation such as provided by Regulation 
1/2003 and Directive 2019/1 should not be blind so as not to allow the non-noticing of 
irregularities occurred in other Member States or before the European Commission.
We will begin by framing what the concept of trust englobes and showing how it is 
normatively framed in EU law. Then, the analysis concentrates on where there are 
boundaries to mutual trust in the decentralised application of art. 101 and 102 TFEU. 
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Subsequently, the questions of how this trust works in practice and what the bounda-
ries are that limit its application are addressed. As the concept of mutual trust is com-
plex itself, this article does not aim to propose detailed solutions de lege ferenda. Its 
ultimate objective is rather to provide a conceptual framework of de lege lata analysis 
of mutual trust in the application of EU competition law. 
KEYWORDS: Mutual trust, ECN, Directive 2019/1, Regulation 1/2003, Cooperation 
within the ECN. 
1. Introduction
The inspiration for this research topic materialised while I was working 
on an article1 about the exchange of information within the European 
Competition Network (ECN), whose role was enforced when Directive 
2019/12 (Directive 2019/1) came into force. While analysing how the 
information circulates3 between the European Commission (EC) and the 
National Competition Authorities (NCA), it became apparent that this 
close cooperation is based on the principle of sincere cooperation,4 which 
is based on mutual trust between not only all the competition authori-
ties, but to some extent, this is also the same for the courts judging cases 
implying the application of art. 101 and art. 1025. However, in contrast to 
the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant,6 the principle 
of mutual trust in competition law is unwritten and the only document 
mentioning trust is the Commission Staff Working Document, Impact 
Assessment accompanying proposal of Directive 2019/1, where it can be 
1 Malgorzata Kozak, “ECN+ Directive – A missed opportunity for strengthening the rights of par-
ties?”, in New Directions of Antitrust Enforcement, ed. Catalin S. Rusu et al. (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2020), 49.
2 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to 
empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to 
ensure the proper functioning on the internal market, OJ L 11, 14.1.2019, 3-33. 
3 European Commission, Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
OJ C 101, 27/04/2004 P. 0043-0053, paragraph 1.
4 Judgment of 3 May 2011, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v. Tele2 Polska sp. z 
o.o., now Netia SA, C375/09, EU:C:2011:270, paragraph 26. 
5 The analysis of a relationship between the European Commission and the courts is not included 
in the scope of this article as it focuses on a relationship between competition authorities. 
6 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and 
the surrender procedures between the Member States – Statements made by certain Member States 
on the adoption of the Framework Decision, OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, 1-20.
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read that “[t]rust in enforcement by NCAs would be enhanced”.7 Directive 
2019/1 itself refers to “authorities being able to rely on each other to carry 
out fact-finding measures on each other’s behalf in order to foster coopera-
tion and mutual assistance among the Member States”.8
Regulation 1/20039, introducing the principle of decentralized applica-
tion of articles 101 and 102 TFEU10, provided for the legal basis for forming 
a network of public authorities interpreting and applying the Community 
competition rules in close cooperation.11 Moreover, with the introduction 
of Regulation 1/2003, the European Commission effectively shared the 
task of enforcing competition rules with the Member States. The ECN is 
composed of the European Commission and national antitrust authori-
ties. Directive 2019/1 submitted the exercise of the NCAs’ powers to appro-
priate safeguards which, at least, comply with the general principles of 
Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(Charter).12
The ultimate objective of Regulation 1/200313 and Directive 2019/114 
is the effective and uniform enforcement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU15 
as prevention from distortion of competition within the internal mar-
ket. Those provisions were introduced to improve enforcement efficiency 
based on the assumption of the equivalence of national systems. Directive 
2019/1 is supplemented by the Notice on NCA cooperation, which clarifies 
7 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of The European Parliament and the 
Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforc-
ers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market https://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/impact_assessment_annexes_en.pdf
8 Directive 2019/1, Preamble, recital 7. 
9 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, 1-25.
10 Regulation 1/2003, article 3 (1).
11 Regulation 1/2003, Preamble, recital 14.
12 Directive 2019/1, Preamble, recital 14.
13 Regulation 1/2003 requires the establishment of mechanisms to ensure the “effective”, “effi-
cient”, “uniform” and/or “coherent” application of the provisions of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
14 Directive 2019/1, Preamble, recitals 1-9.
15 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 19 February 2009, T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, 
C8/08, EU:C:2009:343, paragraphs 85 and 86. Directive 2019/1, Preamble, recital 5. Maciej Gac, 
“Europejska Przestrzeń Administracyjna jako mechanizm zwiększający efektywność stosow-
ania prawa europejskiego – analiza na przykładzie Europejskiej Sieci Konkurencji”, Rocznik 
Administracji Publicznej, 1 (2015): 107. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732511.
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the jurisdictional principles according to which cases should be allocated 
within the ECN.16
These most important manifestations of this close cooperation are 
the allocation of cases within the network, the exchange of information 
between NCAs17 and the Commission, and the provision of assistance in 
carrying out inspections and the collecting of evidence. The CJEU empha-
sises that “Regulation No. 1/2003 puts an end to the previous centralised 
regime and, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, establishes 
a wider association of national competition authorities, authorising them 
to implement Community competition law for this purpose. However, 
the scheme of the regulation relies on the close cooperation to be built up 
between the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member 
States organised as a network, the Commission being given responsibility 
for determining the detailed rules for such cooperation.”18 Directive 2019/1 
provides for certain rules to ensure that national competition authorities 
have the necessary guarantees of independence, resources, and the power 
to impose fines. 
This close cooperation within the ECN is rooted in principle of sincere 
cooperation19 involving more specific concepts such as mutual trust and 
mutual recognition. Without drawing a clear line between those two, as the 
principle of mutual trust is being an underlying principle of mutual recog-
nition or they are often perceived as interchangeable or the mutual trust is 
treated as a meta-principle embodying the principle of mutual recognition, 
it is mostly recognised utterance of trust therein.20 It can be easily tracked 
16 European Commission, Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition 
Authorities (2005) OJ C 101/43, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CEL
EX:52004XC0427(02)&from=EN >.
17 Giorgio Monti, “Independence, interdependence and legitimacy: The EU Commission, National 
Competition Authorities, and the European Competition Network”, EUI Working Paper LAW, 
no. 1 (2014): 17. http://ssrn.com/abstract=237932.
18 Judgment of 8 March 2007, France Télécom SA v. Commission of the European Communities, 
T-339/04, EU:T:2007:80, paragraph 79.
19 Claudia Massa, “Sincere cooperation and antitrust enforcement: Insights from the Damages and 
ECN+ Directives”, European Competition Journal (2019). DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2019.1705631.
20 Tony Marguery, and Ton Van den Brink, “Mutual recognition and mutual trust: Reinforcing EU 
integration”, European Papers 1, no. 3 (2016): 861. Xavier Groussot, Gunnar Thor Petursson, and 
Henrik Wenander, “Regulatory trust in EU Free Movement Law: Adopting the level of protection 
of the other?”, European Papers 1, no. 3 (2016): 866.
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in cases relating to the internal market21, and then it spreads to other areas 
of EU law. In this sense, mutual recognition is used as a bridge between the 
legislative autonomy of the Member States and harmonisation.22 It means 
that in the field of law where it operates, standards and judicial decisions 
made in one Member State are to be accepted and enforced in another 
sometimes quasi-automatically, without any centralisation and hierar-
chy of engaged actors.23 The fundamental importance of the principle of 
mutual trust was also underscored in Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of 
the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), where the 
Court of Justice found that: “it should be noted that the principle of mutual 
trust between the Member States is of fundamental importance in EU law, 
given that it allows an area without internal borders to be created and 
maintained”.24 In this opinion, the CJEU underlined specific characteris-
tics arising from the very nature of EU law, including its primacy over laws 
of the Member States, the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter, 
and by the direct effect of a whole series of provisions, which apply to their 
nationals and the Member States.25 Those specific characteristics led “to a 
structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal 
relations linking the EU and its Member States, and its Member States 
with each other, which are now engaged.” This legal structure is based on 
the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other 
Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common 
values on which the EU is founded, as stated in article 2 TEU.26
Currently, the principle of mutual trust is mainly recognised in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). It concerns particularly judicial 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters. However, as it was emphasised 
21 For a critical analysis of mutual trust in the development of internal market, Jukka Snell, 
“The Single Market: Does Mutual Trust Suffice?”, in Mapping Mutual Trust: Understanding and 
Framing the Role of Mutual Trust in Eu Law (Max Weber Programme 2016/13), ed. Evelien Brouwer, 
and Damien Gerard (Florence: Cadmus, 2016), 11.
22 Marguery, and Van den Brink, “Mutual recognition”, 861. Groussot, Petursson, and Wenander, 
“Regulatory trust”, 866.
23 Marguery, and Van den Brink, “Mutual recognition”, 861.
24 Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, EU:C:2014:2454.
25 The objective of this article is not to analyse to what extent mutual trust is an EU law consti-
tutional principle, nor what kind of limits were imposed by the CJEU in the verification by the 
executing Member States of the EAW. 
26 Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraphs 166-169. 
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by the CJEU mutual trust does not amount to a blind trust.27 The develop-
ment of the case law on the EAW shows that the CJEU, by imposing more 
and more obligations on executing Member States in verifying whether 
there are no irregularities in the Member State issuing the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW) in comparison to early days of its functioning, 
led towards a regulated or conditioned trust. This development mutatis 
mutandis is particularly interesting to analyse while referring to the func-
tioning of cooperation of competition authorities within the EU.28 
Mutual trust as such has not been analysed yet in the literature related 
to EU competition law, especially its underlying existence as to coopera-
tion within the ECN. Cooperation among EU competition authorities is 
mainly analysed through the principle of sincere (loyal) cooperation. The 
research statement of this article is that, based on the outcome of CJEU 
case law in cases concerning EAW such as e.g. Aranyosi and Căldăraru29, 
trust in institutional cooperation such as provided by Regulation 1/2003 
and Directive 2019/1 should not be blind so as not to allow for the non-
noticing of irregularities occurred in other Member States or before the 
European Commission. 
This article is an attempt to frame firstly what the concept of trust 
englobes, and then how it is normatively framed in the EU law. Then, the 
analysis will concentrate on where there are boundaries to mutual trust in 
the decentralised application of art. 101 and 102 TFEU. Subsequently, the 
questions how this trust works in practice, and what are boundaries that 
limit its application are analysed. As the concept of mutual trust is complex 
itself, this paper does not aim to propose any detailed de lege ferenda solu-
tions. Its ultimate objective is rather to provide a conceptual framework of 
de lege lata analysis of mutual trust in application of EU competition law. 
27 Koen Lenaerts, “La vie après l’avis: Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust”, 
Common Market Law Review 54 (2017): 806.
28 Sacha Prechal, “Mutual trust before the Court of Justice of the European Union”, European 
Papers 2, no. 1, (2017): 76.
29 Judgment of 5 April 2016, Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft 
Bremen, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PP, EU:C:2016:198.
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2. Concept of trust
Trust is defined as “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, 
or truth of someone or something”, or it could also mean to rely on the 
truthfulness or accuracy of.30 The notion of trust appeared in early phi-
losophers’ works31, who first tried to frame the very concept. Therefore, 
the authors sometimes related this to that of faith, which can be defined 
as “the ability to accurately evaluate specific objects without any pen-
etration into their essence, into the real form of things”..32 According to 
Plato, faith does not require rational premises. Faith that is supported 
by evidence becomes knowledge. In the case of knowledge, there is 
no or minimal risk, so there is no place for trust. Therefore, it seems 
most appropriate to place trust between faith (boundless trust) and 
knowledge.33
However, already Aristotle in his reflections on rhetoric placed trust in 
relation to both sides of a conversation (as the early word “speech” can be 
defined).34 He placed the concept of trust concerning the interlocutor, cred-
ibility or even faith, therefore the credibility of the interlocutor becomes 
crucial.35 Aristotle sees cognition as a condition of mutual trust. In this 
context, the immanent criteria that are reputation, knowledge, experience 
which one side has in dealing with the other, are important.36 
Seneca, referred to at the beginning of this article, underlines that 
boundless trust without rational premises is a dogmatism that can have 
negative consequences for the trustee.37 Finally, according to Locke, ana-
lysing a context of authority deriving its power from society, trusting gives 
oneself some kind of power resulting from the expectation of the person 
in whom trust is placed, behaviour consistent with the expectations of the 
30 Merriam-Webster internet edition, s.v. trust, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
trust. 
31 For a detailed analysis of mutual trust in modern sociopolitical order: Franz Leander Fillafer, 
“Mutual trust in the history of ideas”, in Mapping Mutual Trust: Understanding and Framing 
the Role of Mutual Trust in Eu Law (Max Weber Programme 2016/13), ed. Evelien Brouwer, and 
Damien Gerard (Florence: Cadmus, 2016), 3.
32 Platon, Państwo, Prawa, Antyk. Kęty, 1997, 218.
33 Monika Czajkowska, “Trust in organization – The philosophical outline of fundamentals of the 
problem”, Acta Universitatis Lodziensis, Folia Oeconomica 234 (2010): 409.
34 Using the Greek word πίστις in the meaning of “trust”.
35 Arystoteles, Dzieła Wszystkie, tom 3, Warszawa: Wyd. Naukowe PWN 1996, s. 272. M. 
Czajkowska, “Trust in organization”, 410.
36 Arystoteles, Dzieła Wszystkie, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1996, vol. 6, 163.
37 Seneka, Listy moralne do Lucyliusza, PWN 1961, 8.
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persons whom one has trusted, and drawing the consequences of acting 
contrary to them.33
Therefore, it can be concluded that, in the context of building trust in 
an at least two-sided relation, Aristotle’s criteria applied mutatis mutandis 
could provide safeguards against boundless trust, providing a framework 
for such cooperation. It is thus essential to consider the existence of cogni-
tion. In respect to cooperation between institutions, trust is relative and 
should be based on mutual credibility. However, this mutual credibility 
should be limited to prevent the negative consequences indicated by Locke. 
3. Trust in EU law
The notion of trust in EU law derives from the principle of loyalty enshrined 
in article 4 (3) TEU.38 It can take many legal morphologies, ranging from 
soft law and preambular commitments to hardcore enforceable rules, 
especially in instruments relating to judicial cooperation in civil and 
criminal matters. Although the principle of mutual trust has been given 
a practical dimension by the Court in its jurisprudence, its legal content 
remains rather elusive. Also, the jurisprudence of the CJEU on the scope 
of application and effects of mutual trust is not clear, as it also applies to an 
accorded level of human rights protection. In particular, the difference, if 
any, between the unwritten principle of ‘mutual trust’ and the principle of 
sincere cooperation, which is enshrined in article 4(3) TEU, can be subject 
to debate which provides that the principle of sincere cooperation requires 
from both the European Union and the Member States to assist each other 
in full mutual respect in carrying out obligations stipulated in the Treaties. 
The principle of sincere cooperation translates into limiting the autonomy 
of Member States unless there is no EU regulation ratione materiae39. 
In cases where EU legislation on the subject is absent, the lawfulness of 
Member States’ actions is assessed in the light of the general principles 
of EU law, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.40 The word-
ing seems to suggest that sincere cooperation is the leading principle in 
38 Groussot, Petursson, and Wenander, “Regulatory trust”, 868. Marcus Klamert, The Principles of 
Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 11. Judgment of 17 December 1998, IP 
v. Borsana, C-2/97, EU:C:1998:613, paragraph 26. Judgment of 14 December 2000 Masterfoods Ltd 
and HB Ice Cream Ltd, C-344/98, EU:C:2000:689.
39 Judgment of 16 December 1976, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, 33/76, EU:C:1976:188.
40 Herwig C. H. Hofmann, “General principles of EU law and EU administrative law”, in European 
Union Law ed. Catherine Barnard, Steve Peers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 200-201. 
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guiding the vertical relationship between EU institutions and its Member 
States, as it strikes balance between the Member State’s independence and 
cooperation within the EU.41
Thus, the principle does not call for simple trust, but even warrants 
cooperation, mutual respect, and assistance – calling for positive action. 
As such, it could be argued that mutual trust has the same conceptual 
underpinning of the principle of sincere cooperation; and the principle of 
mutual trust constitutes lex specialis to the principle of sincere coopera-
tion. Therefore, subsequently, this article will refer to the first one. 
The provision of article 4(3) TEU in statu nascendi applied not only to 
Member States, including their executive and legislative authorities as well 
as their judiciary, creating on their part the obligation to ensure that the 
provisions of EU law take full effect, but also to cooperation42 between the 
EU and the Member States’ institutions.43 
Lenaerts, in his analysis of mutual trust, also points to article 4 (2) TEU 
as the constitutional basis for mutual trust and the relevance of equal-
ity of Member States before the Treaties.44 He concludes that “[t]he EU is 
thus precluded from considering that some national democracies and the 
choices that they make are better than others”. However, the principle of 
equality also imposes on Member States duties to uphold the rule of law 
within the EU.45 At the same time, it implies that “all Member States are 
equally committed to upholding the common values on which the EU is 
founded”.46 
The principle of ‘mutual trust’ is the best-known legal articulation of 
the notion of trust in the EU context, and mutual trust is a core structural 
principle of EU law, although it is not mentioned in the Treaties.47 In its 
Opinion 2/13, the CJEU indicated that “[t]hat principle requires (…) each 
of the [Member] States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all 
the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly 
with the fundamental rights recognized by EU law”.48 Thus, it implies that 
41 Groussot, Petursson, and Wenander, “Regulatory trust”, 867.
42 E.g. Judgment of 22 September 1988, France v. European Parliament, 358/85 and 51/86, 
EU:C:1988:431, paragraphs 34-35. 
43 Klamert, The Principles of Loyalty, 23-25. 
44 Lenaerts, “La vie après l’avis”, 808. 
45 Ibid. Opinion 2/13, paragraph 168. 
46 Lenaerts, “La vie après l’avis”, 809. 
47 Prechal, “Mutual trust “, 75.
48 Opinion 2/13, paragraph 191.
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“the rules of the first Member State are adequate, that they offer equal 
or equivalent protection and that they are applied correctly. In this way, 
mutual recognition is based on mutual confidence”.49 Of course, “equiva-
lent” does not mean identical. This can be extended to a presumption that 
a Member State has complied with (and often implemented) EU law in a 
correct manner. 
However, the condition “save in exceptional circumstances” prevents 
Member States from verifying observance of fundamental rights in another 
Member State.50 This is why, in case of doubts, national courts are obliged 
to apply the preliminary reference procedure.51 The principle entails that 
a Member State should presume that fundamental rights, as well as the 
principles of freedom and rule of law, are respected by the other Member 
States.52 The fundamental right becomes the inherent element of the scope 
of verification provided that no higher level of protection is required from 
another Member State53 and, as per rule, no Member State can check 
whether another Member State has in an individual case observed those 
rights.54 Therefore, as it was stressed in Diego Brandts55, it is not only the 
presumption that EU law is preserved in another Member State, but also 
that (another) Member State is supposed to observe any other EU law pro-
visions, including the existence of legal remedies.56
As Prechal points out in reference to social security regulations, it could 
mean that the competent authority in a Member State which is the home 
country should assess the facts to verify the correctness of documents at 
stake. Then, the authority in the host Member State should rely on the 
appropriateness of these findings.57 Finally, the CJEU ruled that mutual 
49 Prechal, “Mutual trust”, 76. The reference to confidence is used by the CJEU e.g. in the Judgment 
of 5 April 2016, Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru v. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, C-404/15 
and C-659/15 PP, EU:C:2016:198, and also in joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S., EU:C:2011:865, 
paragraph 83. The expressions “mutual trust” and “mutual confidence” are synonyms (in French, 
both those expressions are translated as “confiance mutuelle”).
50 Lenaerts, “La vie après l’avis”, 813.
51 Judgment of 26 February 2013, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107, para-
graph 49. Judgment of 5 April 2016, Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru v. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft 
Bremen, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PP, EU:C:2016:198.
52 Opinion 2/13, paragraph 191.
53 Judgment of 26 February 2013, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107.
54 Prechal, “Mutual trust”, 79. Opinion 2/13, paragraph 192.
55 Judgment of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands BV v. Simiramida-04 EOOD, C-681/13, EU:C:2015:471.
56 Prechal, “Mutual trust”, 83.
57 Prechal, “Mutual trust”, 77.
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recognition and mutual trust need a certain degree of simplicity and 
transparency.58 
In addition, one can observe several cases in which the principle was 
applied to internal market law, where it was applied in the context of pro-
portionality reviews, as well as in connection with the principle of loyal 
cooperation.59 Most of the judgments provided for an application of this 
principle, however, concern the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(“AFSJ”). It also confirms, as debated by Storskrubb, that mutual trust 
“should never be introduced in a void but rather it should form part of 
a complex regulatory strategy, coupled with other tools and support 
structures”.60
Completely referring to Seneca’s thought, mutual trust under EU law 
reaches its limits when it is required by the protection of fundamental 
rights or provided in the secondary law of the European Union, such as 
policy clauses61. It is also well established by the Treaties or secondary leg-
islation that the performance of the principle of mutual recognition can be 
blocked. The detailed analysis of specific conditions allowed by the CJEU 
goes beyond the scope of this analysis as they are often case-by-case based, 
e.g. relating to prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment62. In case of free movement of goods, another Member State 
must present valid reasons if it envisages the refusal of the level of protec-
tion of the State of origin of the products.63 In the AFSJ, the principle of 
mutual trust has functioned as a conceptual precondition for a consistent 
interpretation of these European instruments across the Member States.64 
Last but not least, pursuant to Article 6 (3) TEU, fundamental rights, 
provided for in the ECHR constitute EU general principles.65 The 
European Court of Human Rights confirmed, in its judgment A. Menarini 
58 Ibid., 81.
59 Prechal, “Mutual trust”, 79. The principle of loyal cooperation is enshrined in Article 4(2) TEU. 
60 Eva Storskrubb, “Mutual trust and the limits of abolishing exequatur in civil justice”, in Mapping 
Mutual Trust: Understanding and Framing the Role of Mutual Trust in Eu Law (Max Weber 
Programme 2016/13), ed. Evelien Brouwer, Damien Gerard (Florence: Cadmus, 2016), 21.
61 Prechal “Mutual trust”, 86-87.
62 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 3 March 2016, Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, 
Joined Cases C404/15 and C659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:140, paragraphs 80 et seq.
63 Groussot, Petursson, and Wenander, “Regulatory trust”, 870.
64 See, by way of example, the case law in connection with the “Brussels I Regulation” where ‘anti-
suit injunctions’ were interpreted against the Regulation by using the principle of mutual trust. 
65 The case law of the ECtHR must be taken into account when interpreting the Charter. Opinion 
2/13.
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Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy,66 that “the fine imposed on the applicant com-
pany [by the AGCM, the independent regulatory authority in charge of 
competition – MK], was of a criminal law nature, with the result that 
Article 6 § 1 [ECHR] was applicable, in this instance, under the criminal 
law aspect of that provision”. 
In the light of the above analysis, mutual trust in the decentralised 
application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU will be analysed. Three reference 
points will be considered: how the principle of mutual trust is applied in 
the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, what kind of security valves 
are provided in the legal system, and finally under which circumstances 
this is blind trust indeed. 
4. EU competition law and mutual trust 
i. Recognition of mutual trust in the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU
Under Regulation 1/2003, all ECN members and the European Commission 
have the competence to apply articles 101 and 102 TFEU directly in a 
decentralized way.67 Regulation 1/2003 obliges Member States to desig-
nate a competition authority or authorities to apply articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.68 According to article 11(1) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission 
and the NCAs are to apply the competition rules in close cooperation. As it 
is emphasised in recital 35 to Regulation 1/2003, the variation in the pub-
lic enforcement systems of the Member States is recognised,69 nonetheless 
“the Member States mutually recognise the standards of each other’s sys-
tem as a basis for cooperation”.70 It looks as the recognition by the Member 
States of conditions mentioned in the Opinion 2/2013, namely that rules 
of Member States are adequate, provide an equivalent level of protection 
and that they are applied correctly. However, it misses the second part as 
to exceptional circumstances that prevent the Member States from veri-
fying observance of fundamental rights in another Member State. The 
ECN+ Directive fulfills the gap as to ensure that at least the equal level of a 
66 A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 43509/08, 27 September 2011.
67 Regulation 1/2003, Preamble, Recital 4. 
68 Regulation 1/2003, Article 35 (1).
69 Regulation 1/2003, Preamble, Recital 35. 
70 European Commission, Council, Joint Statement by the Council and the Commission on the 
functioning of the network of competition authorities, entered in the Council minutes (doc. 
15435/02 ADD 1 of 10 December 2002), 6-8.
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playing field is assured, which could indicate that not all the participating 
Member States “earned” mutual trust through effective compliance. 
As it results from the proposal71, it was considered that “[s]ome NCAs 
do not have enforceable guarantees that they can apply the EU competi-
tion rules independently without taking instructions from public or pri-
vate entities. A number of authorities struggle with insufficient human and 
financial resources. This may have an impact on their ability to effectively 
enforce. For example, some NCAs are not able to carry out simultaneous 
inspections of all members of a suspected cartel, giving the others valuable 
time to destroy evidence and escape detection. Others lack the appropriate 
forensic IT tools to find evidence of infringements”. Chapter III of the ECN 
+ Directive is devoted to the independence and resources of organs. The 
provisions of article 4 refer to independence and article 5 to resources.72 
The directive should be implemented by February 4, 2021. 
Moreover, the ECN + Directive indicates in art. 3 that the proceedings 
regarding violations of Arts. 101 or 102 TFEU run by national competi-
tion authorities must comply with the general principles of Union law and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The ECN+ 
Directive Preamble refers to the right to be heard, including the right to 
good administration and the respect of undertakings’ rights of defence. 
Neither article 3 nor the Preamble refer to the right to a fair trial that is 
provided by the Charter. No specification as to how these safeguards are 
to be ensured is provided. The obligation imposed on Member States is 
to “ensure that the exercise of the powers referred to in paragraph 1 is 
subject to appropriate safeguards in respect of the undertakings’ rights of 
defence, including the right to be heard and the right to an effective rem-
edy before a tribunal” (article 3 (2)), which means that no national legisla-
tion is required and it will be assessed on case-by-case basis by NCA and 
courts. The ECN+ Directive only imposes those obligations with respect 
to the general principles and the Charter on the Member States. It does 
not take into account the multi-level character of the ECN73 and different 
axes of cooperation (vertical/horizontal). The rights of defence are now 
71 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the com-
petition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market, COM/2017/0142 final – 2017/063, 2. 
72 ECN+ Directive, articles 4, 5.
73 Firat Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: the European Competition 
Network”, European Law Review 35, no. 5 (2010): 661. 
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framed in articles 41(2) and 48(2) of the Charter, however, their application 
is not absolute. According to AG Kokott in her opinion in FSL Holdings, 
“the rights of the defence provide only certain procedural safeguards 
which the Commission must observe when conducting those proceedings, 
with the infringement of such safeguards leading to the annulment of the 
Commission’s final decision”.74 The ECN + Directive does not specify the 
link between the effectiveness of the authorities and their independence. It 
also omits the issue of ensuring a balance between the effectiveness of the 
authority’s operation and ensuring the protection of the rights of under-
takings in the course of achieving the objectives imposed on the competi-
tion authority. Undoubtedly, this issue will recur in the course of disputes 
on appeals against decisions of the authorities.
One can expect the application of the principle of mutual trust to be 
raised in all those circumstances where possible overlaps of jurisdiction, 
interpretation and/or enforcement might occur. In that sense, the principle 
functions as a compass to ensure the coherent application of EU law and 
thereby avoid the legal uncertainty that stems from overlaps and possibly 
conflicting outcomes. 
The scheme of Regulation 1/2003 relies on a close cooperation to be devel-
oped between the Commission and the NCAs organised as a network, with 
the Commission being given responsibility for determining the detailed 
rules for such cooperation.75 Finally, as emphasised in the Commission 
Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
even though the Commission is particularly well placed to deal with a 
case if it is closely linked to other EU provisions which may be exclusively 
or more effectively applied by the Commission, the Commission is apt to 
develop EU competition policy when a new competition issue arises or to 
ensure effective enforcement.76 The question as to which authority is “well 
placed”77 is relevant for leniency summary applications, as it was pointed 
out that “the national competition authorities are free to adopt leniency 
programmes and each of those programmes is autonomous, not only in 
74 Kozak, “ECN+ Directive”, 52.
75 Judgment of 8 March 2007, France Télécom SA v. Commission of the European Communities, 
T-339/04, EU:T:2007:80, paragraphs 79 and 84. 
76 Opinion of Advocate General Mazák delivered on 7 December 2010, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony 
Konkurencji i Konsumentów v. Tele2 Polska sp. zoo, now Netia SA w Warszawie, C375/09, 
EU:C:2010:743, paragraph 15. 
77 European Commission, Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition 
Authorities, paragraph 14. 
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respect of other national programmes, but also in respect of the EU leni-
ency programme”.78
As underlined by AG Mazak, “The decentralisation of the enforce-
ment of EU competition law goes further than simply requiring NCAs 
and national courts to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU”.79 To carry out 
this objective, Regulation No. 1/2003 provides for the following distinct 
mechanisms: 
• the conferral of power and the requirement on NCAs80 and national 
courts to apply article 101 and article 102 within a system regulating 
the relationship between national and EU law; 
• arrangements to facilitate cooperation and control of the work of the 
NCAs and the national courts in order to safeguard a uniform and 
coherent application of the EU competition rules.81
ii.  The limits to the principle of mutual trust in decentralised application of 
articles 101 and 102 TFEU
Thus, although Regulation 1/2003 accommodates for the diversity in the 
institutional and procedural environments in the EU82, neither Regulation 
1/2003 nor ECN+ Directive harmonises national procedural rules that 
regulate the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Commission 
considered such harmonisation unnecessary provided that the principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence are preserved.83 Moreover, the discrep-
78 Judgment of 20 January 2016, DHL Express (Italy) Srl, DHL Global Forwarding (Italy) SpA v. 
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, C428/14, EU:C:2016:27. 
79 Opinion Of Advocate General Mazák delivered on 7 December 2010, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony 
Konkurencji i Konsumentów v.Tele2 Polska sp. zoo, now Netia SA w Warszawie, C-375/09, 
EU:C:2010:743, paragraph 14.
80 In Judgment of 18 June 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde and Bundeskartellanwalt v Schenker & 
Co. AG and Others, C-681/11, EU:C:2013:404, the Court of Justice held that, in order to ensure that 
article 101 is effectively applied in the general interest (‘effet utile’), an NCA may only exceptionally 
not impose a fine where an infringement is established.
81 Opinion of Advocate General Mazák delivered on 7 December 2010, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony 
Konkurencji i Konsumentów v.Tele2 Polska sp. zoo, now Netia SA w Warszawie, C-375/09, 
EU:C:2010:743, paragraph 14.
82 Carles Esteva Mosso, “Regulation 1/2003 – Five years on”, in 16th St Gallen International 
Competition Law Forum 2009, ed. Carl Baudenbacher (Germany: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2010), 
247. Christophe Lemaire, “Premier bilan de l’application du règlement no. 1/2003”, Petites affiches, 
no. 251 (2009): 38.
83 ECN+ Directive Preamble, Recital 15. Daniel Reichelt, “To what extent does the co-operation 
within the European Competition Network protect the rights of undertakings?”, Common Market 
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ancies between the Member States remain, including the possibility for 
criminal penalties, liability of associations of undertakings, time limits of 
specific actions, and the applicable standard of proof.84 Finally, especially 
articles 3(2) and 16(2) of Regulation No. 1/2003 exert a strong harmonising 
influence over the interpretation of national competition law.85
As previously stated, the central objective of the creation of a decentral-
ised system of application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU is their effective, 
uniform and coherent application. Jóźwiak indicates that the European 
Commission’s role considering the other NCAs under Regulation 
1/2003 and article 105 (1) TFEU is primus inter pares, as the European 
Commission is the authority responsible for the coherent and effective 
application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU and for shaping the European 
competition culture.86 Gac refers to the “dominant position of the 
European Commission”.87 This “dominant” position is expressed through 
various mechanisms, e.g. the fact that national courts88 and NCAs cannot 
decide contrary to the Commission’s decisions89 and the Commission has 
a final word in cases’ allocation, etc. The key element is the interpreta-
tion of the influence on intra-Union trade which triggers the application 
of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but also leaves a significant margin of discre-
tion to the Commission. 90 The Commission surely takes this notion rather 
seriously and dedicates part of its monitoring efforts to this, as can be seen 
Law Review 42 (2005): 747. European Commission, Notice on co-operation between Commission 
and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, Official Journal 
C 101, 27.04.2004, paragraph 2, 10 (c).
84 Mosso, “Regulation 1/2003”, 247
85 Helmut Brokelmann, “Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC under Regulation 1/2003: The case 
of Spain and Portugal”, World Competition 29, no. 4 (2006): 553.
86 Sonia Jóźwiak, Europejska Sieć Konkurencji — model: struktura i współpraca oraz kompetencje 
decyzyjne członków, Warszawa 2011, 8. www.uokik.gov.pl. Kati Cseres, and Annalies Outhuijse, 
“Parallel Enforcement and Accountability: The Case of EU Competition Law” (June 30, 2017), 
University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper, No. 11, (2017): 11. https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2995729 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2995729
87 Gac, “Europejska Przestrzeń Administracyjna”, 105. Cseres, Outhuijse, “Parallel Enforcement 
and Accountability: The Case of EU Competition Law”, 13.
88 On that point, see, in particular, paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 21 and 22 in the preamble to Regulation 
No 1/2003. Even for the period prior to 1 May 2004, the Court had already stressed the obligation 
to cooperate in good faith, incumbent upon the national courts in the field of competition law. 
Masterfoods v. HB, C-344/98, EU:C:2000:689, paragraph 49.
89 Christopher Townley, A Framework for European Competition Law, Co-ordinated Diversity 
(Oxford: Hart 2019), 348. 
90 Regulation 1/2003, although sincere cooperation is not mentioned in the text of the Regulation.
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in the Analytical Report on mutual assistance and sincere cooperation.91 
This is the area where the Commission is considered dominant and exer-
cises some control over activities of the NCAs. The objective of this control 
is the uniform application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It could be said 
that this is the principle that establishes safety valves to the activities car-
ried out by the NCAs and national courts, as provided in article 15 (3) of 
Regulation 1/2003. However, in practice, the outcome of procedures ini-
tiated by different NCAs may differ from one Member State to another, 
which could lead to problems of consistency.92
Moreover, the principle of (sincere) cooperation extends to the powers 
of NCAs to rule over breaches of EU provisions in individual cases.93 As 
such, sincere cooperation has effects not only on the jurisdictional alloca-
tion of powers between the NCAs and the Commissions, but also on the 
substantive powers of NCAs. This principle allowed the Court to rule that 
competition authorities, in reviewing a possible abuse of dominant posi-
tion under article 102 TFEU, may only state that “there are no grounds for 
action” and may not take the step further to decide that article 102 TFEU 
as such was not breached.94 This is a result of the system of cooperation 
between the Commission and the NCAs as established under Regulation 
1/2003, and stems from the fact that the Commission alone is “empow-
ered to make a finding that there has been no breach of the prohibition of 
abuse of a dominant position”.95 Such a solution provided by the CJEU was 
justified by a need for uniform application of article 102 TFEU, the word-
ing and the scheme of Regulation 1/2003, and the objective it pursues. An 
introduction of the possibility for the NCAs to issue “negative decisions” 
on no breach of article 102 TFEU could lead to calling into question the 
system of cooperation established by the Regulation and would under-
mine the power of the Commission.96
91 European Commission, “Analytical Report 2017 on mutual assistance and sincere cooperation”, 
(2017), https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19403&langId=en. 
92 Massa provides the example of proceedings carried in the case of Booking by the Italian 
(AGCM), French (Autorite de la Concurrence) and Swedish (Konkurrensverket) Authorities 
under the general coordination of the Commission implying application of article 11(2), 11(3) and 
11(4) of Regulation 1/2003. Massa, “Sincere cooperation”, 16.
93 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 5.
94 Judgment of 3 May 2011, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v. Tele2 Polska sp. 
z o.o., now Netia SA, C-375/09, EU:C:2011:270. 
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid, paragraph 27.
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Further, article 11(2) of Regulation 1/2003 requires the Commission to 
transmit to NCAs the most important documents collected with a view 
to the adoption of decisions under articles 7 to 10 and article 29(1). On 
the other hand, the Commission is empowered to relieve NCAs of their 
competence to apply articles 101 and 102 TFEU in an individual case.97 The 
Commission’s position is also strengthened by the provision in article 16 
of Regulation 1/2003. It means that neither NCAs, nor national courts can 
take decisions that run counter to a Commission decision.
Finally, the most recent supplements to the system, namely the require-
ment of independence and the minimum standard of the Charter, are 
introduced by Directive 2019/1. 
As it is underlined by Directive 2019/1, the guarantees of independ-
ence, resources, and enforcement and fining powers are necessary for the 
effective enforcement of Union competition rules.98 Again, the effective-
ness and coherent application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU are the major 
objectives that is assured by the independence of NCAs.99 It shows that 
the Commission noted existing lacunae in the independence of NCAs that 
influence the outcome of proceedings. It could also be read as a motion 
of no confidence in respect to the authorities that comprise the ECN. 
Moreover, it should be noted that in order to assure the work of the ECN 
as a cohesive whole based on close cooperation, it is necessary to introduce 
the common level of tools and guarantees of NCAs.100 Therefore, in order 
to foster cooperation and mutual assistance, specific fact-finding tools as 
a conditio sine qua non of mutual assistance are necessary. Nevertheless, 
the input of Directive 2019/1 should be assessed positively and strengthen 
mutual trust within the ECN, as some of the NCAs do not fulfill require-
ments included in the Directive.101 It resonates with Aristotle’s thought on 
the credibility of an interlocutor. 
The European Commission assumes that article 12(2) of Regulation 
1/2003 provides for “a sufficient degree of equivalence of the rights of 
97 The Commission has not exercised power under art. 11(6).
98 Directive 2019/1, Recital 5, Preamble.
99 Malgorzata Kozak, “One, three and two, and independent will be you... On the necessity of the 
wider analysis of independence of Polish National Competition Authority in the light of ECN+ 
directive”, iKAR 8 (2019): 23. 
100 Directive 2019/1, Recital 7, Preamble.
101 Kozak, “One, three and two”, 23.
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defence in the different enforcement systems”.102 Article 3 of Directive 
2019/1 introduces the general principle that proceedings concerning 
infringements of article 101 or 102 TFEU must at least comply with the 
general principles of Union law and the Charter, which means that there 
is a minimum common standard established. As recently confirmed by 
the CJEU,103 the Charter is not only applicable where the provisions of EU 
law in the area concerned do not govern an aspect of a given situation and 
do not impose any specific obligation on the Member States with regard 
thereto. The national rule enacted by a Member State as regards that aspect 
falls outside the scope of the Charter and the situation concerned can-
not be assessed in the light of the provisions of the Charter.104 Thus, the 
provision of Directive 2019/1 simply confirms that the standard of protec-
tion of the Charter should be preserved while applying arts. 101 and 102 
TFEU. However, at the same time, Directive 2019/1 provides explicitly for 
a minimum standard that needs to be applied by all the NCAs within the 
network. 
iii. Blind trust within the ECN
However, neither Regulation 1/2003 nor Directive 2019/1 provide for 
European Commission competence to verify the actions carried out by 
NCAs within the scope of cooperation. The same applies to NCAs verify-
ing the actions undertaken by other NCAs. 
One of the examples of the lack of such competence is provided by the 
rules on the exchange of information between the NCAs and the European 
Commission.105 These exchanges are crucial for the functioning of the 
102 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council – Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, {SEC(2009)574}, recital 16.
103 Judgment of 19 November 2019, Terveys- ja sosiaalialan neuvottelujärjestö (TSN) ry v. 
Hyvinvointialan liitto ry, and Auto- ja Kuljetusalan Työntekijäliitto AKT v. Satamaoperaattorit ry, 
C-609/17 and C-610/17, EU:C:2019:981, paragraphs 42-43.
104 See, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2014,  Víctor Manuel Julian Hernández and Others v. 
Reino de España (Subdelegación del Gobierno de España en Alicante) and Others, C-198/13, 
EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 35. Judgment of 14 December 2017, Antonio Miravitlles Ciurana and 
Others v. Contimark SA and Jordi Socias Gispert, C-243/16, EU:C:2017:969, paragraph 34; Judgment 
of 19 April 2018, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v. Rete Ferroviaria 
Italiana SpA, C-152/17, EU:C:2018:264, paragraphs 34 and 35.
105 The legal framework for the exchange of information in antitrust cases including confidential 
information within the network is article 105 (1) TFEU, article 4(3) TEU on duty of sincere co-
operation, and articles 11 and 12 of Regulation 1/2003. Information that is obtained on the basis of 
article 22 Regulation 1/2003 can also be exchanged on the basis of article 12 of Regulation 1/2003. 
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ECN, as illustrated by the fact that the exchange of information was also 
one of the very first tasks of the ECN.106 Information collected by one sys-
tem can be used as evidence in another system, provided that the general 
conditions of article 12(2) are fulfilled, particularly that the information 
may be used only for the purpose of applying article 101 or 102 TFEU and 
in respect of the ‘subject matter’ for which it was collected. It is emphasised 
that this system creates a “double barrier”. Firstly, the authority collecting 
the information acts according to its own national rules of due process, and 
then the authority receiving the information delivers a decision according 
to its own rules of due process.107 In practice, as explained by the CJEU in 
the France Telecom Judgment, the prohibition on using information for 
other purposes than those for which it was collected should be considered 
on a case by case basis, since it is aimed to meet a specific need, “namely 
the need to ensure that the procedural safeguards inherent to the collec-
tion of information by the Commission and by the national competition 
authorities in the context of their tasks are respected, while allowing an 
exchange of information between those authorities”(paragraph 78). If this 
prohibition was of a general character, it would render the tasks entrusted 
to the Commission and the NCAs more difficult. 
Consequently, in the context of mutual trust, it needs to be emphasised 
that cooperation within the ECN does not include a verification of appro-
priateness of procedures accomplished by an authority sending the infor-
mation e.g. concerning privacy. There is no verification as to the period 
of storage of information or data protection requirements. In response to 
some claims concerning the application of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR),108 also in competition investigations,109 the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), in its letter dated 22 October 2018, 
The ECN+ Directive indicates that the exchange of information must be carried in accordance 
with article 12 of Regulation 1/2003. Moreover, article 28 of Regulation 1/2003 provides safeguards 
concerning professional secrecy. Further safeguards are included in the Commission Notice on 
cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities in section 2.2.3.
106 Monti, “Independence”, 17.
107 Townley, A framework, 381. 
108 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, 1-88.
109 EDPS letter addressed to the DPOs of the EC, EIB, and EIF on implications of GDPR on inves-
tigative activities of EU institutions, notably regarding anti-fraud, competition and trade, WW/
OL/sn/D(2018)2422 C 2018-0632, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-10-30_let-
ter_investigative_activities_eui_gdpr_en.pdf.
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indicated that the GDPR does not change the situation substantially. 
However, EU institutions including the DG COM are required to observe 
a high standard of data protection on the basis of a specific regulation 
applicable to EU institutions, which is Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.110 This 
Regulation is not applicable to NCAs. In its letter, the EDPS notably ana-
lysed whether individual notifications under article 14 GDPR to the data 
subject are necessary while collecting and processing of personal data by 
EU institutions. Such a possibility could lead to impacting an investigation 
by warning potential suspected companies. The EDPS notes that, when 
exercising their powers under Union law, EU institutions may qualify 
as “independent administrative authorities” which are not considered as 
“recipients” under article 14(1) (e) read together with article 4(9) GDPR. 
Thus, they can “receive personal data in the framework of a particular 
inquiry in accordance with Union law”. However, this does not apply to 
standard financial verifications and checks (e.g. checking the eligibility of 
declared expenses as part of standard ex-post controls). The EDPS empha-
sises that “in those cases, EU institutions have to inform data subjects up 
front about the processing, for example using the data protection notice 
for grant management or other relevant procedures”. Therefore, there is no 
procedural possibility for the European Commission, nor the NCA to con-
firm appropriateness of procedures accomplished by an authority sending 
the information. The ECN authorities apply mutual trust in this exchange 
considering that it is for national data protection authorities to verify how 
the personal data is collected and proceeded by the NCAs. Again, it could 
lead to different procedural outcomes in case of individual proceedings. 
In this respect, AG Kokott emphasised that article 12 of Regulation 
1/2003 provides that evidence exchanged between NCAs and the European 
Commission may be used automatically in antitrust proceedings.111 The 
exclusion of evidence is not possible even in the case of evidence coming 
from an authority not belonging to the ECN, as it would be contrary to the 
principle of the procedural autonomy of Member States and could obstruct 
another principle, such as effective enforcement of EU competition law. 
110 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001 and Decision No. 1247/2002/EC, PE/31/2018/REV/1, OJ L 295, 
21.11.2018, 39-98.
111 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 17 November 2016, FSL Holdings and Others 
v. European Commission, C-469/15 P, EU:C:2016:884, paragraph 30. 
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According to her, there is no general principle derived from article 12 
(2) of Regulation 1/2003 stating that the only evidence that may be used in 
antitrust proceedings is that which has already been gathered for the pur-
poses of such proceedings. She emphasised that “[i]t does not follow from 
this, however, that evidence which was gathered for a purpose other than 
competition (…) must never be used for a purpose connected with com-
petition law (…)” (paragraph 47). According to AG Kokott, the evidence 
cannot be used only in case the legislation (national or EU) specifically 
describes an intended purpose for particular items of evidence. Therefore 
their reuse for purposes other than that for which they were originally 
gathered is subject to a prohibition, e.g. article 28 (1) Regulation 1/2003. In 
practice, this blind mutual trust leads to the impossibility of challenging 
any kind of evidence obtained by competition authorities, as the legality of 
a gathering of information is defined according to the national law binding 
on the national authority and Regulation 1/2003 does not refer directly to 
it112. If the system remains in the present shape, it would be useful to intro-
duce an independent officer able to verify the appropriateness and legality 
of actions within the network.113 
The other illustration substantiating that mutual trust in the application 
of EU law exists without real safety valves is the lack of accountability and 
transparency of decisions taken within the network114 which, in combina-
tion with the lack of legal personality115, could lead to due process issues. 
However, Directive 2019/1 already provides for the same safeguards, which 
are general principles of the Union law and principles stemming from the 
Charter.116 It strengthens the presumption that other Member States have 
applied those principles. However, it still does not provide the competence 
for the first Member State to verify the due process of the second, nor does 
it provide for consequences in case due process principles are not pre-
served. The question regarding how Member States should “earn” mutual 
trust remains open. The question whether authorities should be blind to 
irregularities before other Member States, therefore, remains. 
112 Reichelt, “To what extent”, 751. 
113 Kozak, “ECN+ Directive”, 53.
114 Imelda Maher, “Competition law networks and the challenge of transparency” (February 22, 
2019), UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 1/2019. 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3339884.
115 Cseres, Outhuijse, “Parallel enforcement”, 17.
116 Directive 2019/1, Art. 2. 
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5. Conclusion
The mutual trust in the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU was 
implicitly introduced by Regulation 1/2003. The only limits that were pro-
vided were limited to the uniform application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
and the set of decisive powers of the European Commission in respect 
to the allocation of cases, and the obligation imposed on NCAs to con-
sult decisions. The existence of various actors, e.g. NCAs, the European 
Commission and sometimes courts, the requirements of accountability 
and independence of NCAs and the implications of general principles 
of the EU law and the Charter have added more and more complexity to 
the foundations of cooperation. The existence of mutual trust is appar-
ent in exchange for information within the ECN, mutual assistance, etc. 
However, no competence to verify the actions of other authorities is pro-
vided. The task of reviewing decisions adopted by competition authorities 
belonging to the network will remain with national courts and the CJEU. 
It is important for them to remain vigilant to the existence of this blind 
mutual trust and its eventual implications for parties to the proceedings. 
In any case, it could lead to different procedural outcomes, as is the case of 
application of the mutual trust principle in AFSJ,117 by different Member 
States, even if the minimum standard of a Charter is preserved.
Nevertheless, the entry into force of Directive 2019/1 offered a great 
opportunity to set the boundaries to mutual trust in the cooperation 
among the European Commission and the NCAs and between the NCAs. 
Of course, both the practice and the assessment of the CJEU will show 
whether those boundaries are sufficient. However, as in the case of ASFJ, 
the cooperation between NCAs will be analysed in a more and more spe-
cific way. “Trust takes years to build and only minutes to destroy”, there-
fore the credibility of bodies within the ECN remains essential. The ques-
tion whether they earned it remains open. 
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